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The number of enterprises plunging into bankruptcy starting in 2008,' during which time
China was affected by the global financial crisis, tested the efficacy of the Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law (EBL), which established a statutory-based reorganization process to be followed and which
was seemingly designed for the resurrection of corporate entities caught in financial malaises. Dur-
ing the global financial crisis, the EBL served its intended purpose-the prevention of a greater
number of small-and medium-sized enterprises in temporary financial difficulties from premature
corporate bankruptcy; but the implementation of the EBL and, by extension, China's corporate
bankruptcy system was less than ideal. One of the main tenets of the EBL is the requirement for
any reorganization plan to be approved dually-i.e., sanctioned by both the creditors and the court;
hut the EBL fails to prescribe clearly the circumstances under which the court's discretionary power
in granting its approval should he exercised and, if so done, to what extent those powers should be
kept in check.
The deficiencies of the EBL might impact adversely China's securities markets because there is a
strong linkage between an effective corporate bankruptcy reorganization system and increased se-
curities trading. A listed company facing bankruptcy but whose shares remain tradable in China's
securities market would normally be labeled as an *ST corporation2 first, before being delisted
eventually. While reorganization can theoretically, if not practically, provide reprieve for a bank-
rupt company by saving it from premature corporate bankruptcy, recent research has indicated that
the number of successful reorganization cases are few and far between. The paucity of successful
bankruptcy reorganization cases in China suggests the EBL, as it was implemented, may have
inadvertently put restraints in its own application, in contrast to the more efficacious corporate
bankruptcy laws in jurisdictions such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
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1. Shuguang Li & Zuofa Wang, China's Bankruptcy Law After Three Years: The Gaps Between Legislation
Erpectancy and Practice and the Future Road-Part One, 7(5) Int'l Corp. Rescue 303, 304 (2010).
2. ST means 'special treatment.' Special treatment connotes a distinctive 'warning system' that was for-
mulated by the securities exchanges in China to warn investors of listed companies suffering severe losses and
that are at risk of being delisted from the stock exchange(s). For more details, please refer to infra Part IV
concerning the issue of "*ST" prefixed corporations. See id. at 307.
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each of which provided a model for reorganization legislation. There are both internal and exter-
nal factors attributive to such lackluster results following the EBL's implementation. The internal
factors consist of somejudges' preference in applying the old law (which contains no reorganization
provisions whatsoever) over the newer EBL, as the new law is less familiar to them. The external
factors comprise local protectionism of preferred enterprises and a lack of qualified bankruptcy pro-
fessionals in China. This article aims to examine the implementation and practice of China's
corporate reorganization process, formed and shaped by Chapter 8 of the EBL, immediately before
and throughout the global financial crisis. Relevant issues in regards to the administrator system
and the expenses associated with the reorganization process will also be addressed. It is hoped that
this article, if construed properly, may inform of future amendments to China's EBL.
I. Introduction
China's corporate bankruptcy 3 system is comprised mainly of two parts: (1) the Enter-
prise Bankruptcy Law of 2006 (the EBL or new law), passed into law by the National
People's Congress and (2) judicial interpretations,4 made by the Supreme People's Court
of the People's Republic of China (the SPC), the highest court of law in China. The EBL,
consisting of twelve chapters with 136 articles, was promulgated on August 27, 2006 and
came into effect on June 1, 2007. The five judicial interpretations to date have been
issued at various times in order to facilitate the implementation of the EBL.
At the heart of China's corporate reorganization process is the independent administra-
tor system. The EBL distinguishes itself from its predecessor law, the 1986 Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law Trial Implementation (the 1986 Law or old law), with some distinctive
features. First, the EBL has broader application as it applies to all enterprise legal per-
sons, inclusive of SOEs, non-SOEs, private enterprises, and foreign-invested enterprises
(not just state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as in the old law5 ). Second, the EBL replaced
the liquidation group system with the independent administrator system. Inspired by
both the U.S. and the U.K. models, the EBL also provides for a reorganization system by
drawing upon Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code6 (U.S. Chapter 11) and introduces
an independent administrator system by borrowing from the concept of administrator in
the U.K.'s Insolvency Act 1986.7
'Reorganization' (i.e., '[corporate] bankruptcy reorganization,' also known as 'corporate
rescue' in some jurisdictions) encapsulates a legal procedure that aids the revival of a com-
3. The words 'insolvency' and 'bankruptcy' are used interchangeably throughout this article, and refer to
bankruptcy of a corporate nature and not a personal one.
4. With a view to facilitating the implementation the EBL, the Supreme People's Court has in 2007-2008
issued five judicial interpretations, namely: (1) Supreme People's Court Regulation on Law Application of
Cases Still Pending upon the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of People's Republic of China Coming into Effect
(Fashi (2007) 10, Apr. 23, 2004); (2) Supreme People's Court Regulation on the Appointment of Administra-
tors (Fashi (2007) 8, Apr. 4, 2007); (3) Supreme People's Court Regulation on the Compensations of Admin-
istrators (Fashi (2007) 9, Apr. 4, 2007); (4) Supreme People's Court Regulation on Bankruptcy Cases in which
the Whereabouts of the Debtor or Its Assets are Unclear (Fashi (2008) 10, Aug. 4, 2008); and (5) Supreme
People's Court Regulation on Time Limits for Hearing Civil Cases (Fashi (2008) 11, Aug. 11, 2008. See Li &
Wang, supra note 1, at 303.
5. Compared to the EBL, the 1986 Law has a narrower scope of application as it concerned merely, and
thus applied only to, the bankruptcy of SOEs.
6. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-74 (1978).
7. United Kingdom Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45.
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pany in current and temporary financial difficulty but with viable business prospects and
whose business operations may be operated continually as a going concern during the
reorganization process. Reorganization giyes the financially distressed company a short
respite or 'breathing space,' generally referred to as a 'moratorium' (or an 'automatic stay'
of corporate bankruptcy proceedings) with which the debtor company (i.e., the financially
distressed company) will be free temporarily from its creditors' debt collection or debt
enforcement actions. Reorganization cannot be executed effectively without the statutory
protection of a moratorium against the company's creditors, whose rights of claims will be
suspended temporarily while the company seeks ways to restructure itself and its debts.
For each creditor, if he agrees to the company's reorganization initiative, his right of
claims under relevant corporate bankruptcy law will be barred temporarily from being
exercised or brought to a halt in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. A moratorium
thus works as a major intervention, with the overriding purpose of preserving the debtor
company's employees' jobs and averting the unnecessary winding-up of the company.
Technically, a reorganization application in China may be commenced by a debtor com-
pany itself, a creditor, or an investor whose capital contribution comprises one-tenth (1/
10th) or more of the debtor company's registered capital.8 Initially, a debtor or creditor
may apply directly to the People's Court for the reorganization of the debtor company,
but in circumstances where there is a liquidation application by a creditor, the debtor
company or investor may still apply to the People's Court for reorganization, provided
that the said court, after accepting the previous bankruptcy application by the creditor, has
not yet declared the debtor company to be bankrupt.9 Reorganization appears to be a
welcome solution for companies listed in stock exchanges in China. Recent study shows
that over a period of eight years (from March 2000 to March 2008), there were merely
eighteen listed companies that filed for bankruptcy; among which, all but one company
had undergone the reorganization process. Each of those seventeen listed companies had
been reorganized successfully by reaching a settlement plan with its creditors,10 while the
remaining one company's bankruptcy application was rejected eventually by the court."
The EBL is built on the three pillars of (1) liquidation; (2) reorganization; and (3) set-
tlement, whereof the law offers comprehensive options for a bankrupt company to choose
from in order to practically and effectively eliminate its debts and associated liabilities.
Reorganization may potentially predominate over liquidation or settlement as viable op-
tions, at least when and only if financial difficulty arises at an early enough stage that it is
still possible to attempt corporate rescue. Reorganization can also prevent the bankrupt
company from premature or unnecessary liquidation and, as a result, the employees' jobs
can be saved. Reorganization is oftentimes a precondition for settlement, as reorganiza-
tion would inevitably involve the preparation of a settlement agreement. Thus one can
view that reorganization, if successful, is consummated by reaching a settlement between
8. Qi Yl P6 Chan Fa ( [Enterprise Bankruptcy Law], (promulgated by Standing Comm.,
Nat' People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 7, 2007), art. 70, translated in http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/
FDIEN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/PO20070118609950781519.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2011) (China) [hereinafter The EBL].
9. Id. at art. 70, 2.
10. Qmu Bo YANG, ± R [Choice of Behavior of Listed Companies and
its Effects on Bankruptcy], Southwestern University Finance & Economics Press (2008), at 139-141. (The book
is printed in Chinese).
11. Id. at 139.
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the debtor company and all its creditors. It would seem to follow that the pinnacle of the
EBL is reorganization, to be carried out by a court-appointed independent administrator
whose main task is to carry on the debtor company's business operation as a going concern
over a statutorily prescribed period called a moratorium. Only when that fails will the
debtor company be wound up and liquidated.
China is a country more accepting of legal transplantation. A case in point is that
China's corporate rescue system is a hybrid of the systems used in the United States (the
U.S.) and the United Kingdom (the U.K.)-the former refers to 'debtor-in-possession'
(DIP) and the latter, 'administrator replacement.' Under the U.S. system, the debtor
company's management is permitted to stay and continue to run the business as a going
concern; under the U.K. system, the management would be replaced by an independent
administrator who would run the business during the reorganization process. Under the
Chinese system, the administrators must be appointed by the People's Court 2 from the
roster system, 13 kept and operated by the said court. The administrators should be dili-
gent and faithful in the performance of their duties14 and such positions should be held by
professional service firms, such as law firms, accounting firms, liquidation firms, and/or
persons qualified professionally to manage bankruptcy procedures.' 5 During the pre-
scribed period of moratorium, it is the administrator's responsibility to deliver a reorgani-
zation plan, essentially a settlement or concession proposal subject to 'dual approval,'-
first by creditors of all four voting classes' 6 and then by the court.'7 Alternatively, the
existing management (represented by directors of the company) may produce a reorgani-
zation proposal under the DIP model (like the U.S. system).', Once approved at 'meet-
ings of the creditors' by creditors and sanctioned by the court, the reorganization proposal
will have a binding effect on the debtor company and all its creditors.' 9
Reorganization is arguably the most innovative feature of the EBL, applicable to all
enterprise legal persons. And yet, reorganization in China can possibly take a long time
and be expensive. First, reorganization requires the submission of numerous plans: (1)
the business plan of the debtor company; (2) the classification of debt claims; (3) the plan
for claims adjustment; (4) the plan for claims repayment; (5) the time limit for implement-
ing the reorganization plan; (6) the time limit for supervision over the implementation of
the reorganization plan; and (7) other plans favorable to the debtor company's reorganiza-
tion. 20 Second, the reorganization procedure can spread across a period of almost a year,
comprising the original six months set by the EBL as the 'reorganization period,' which is
12. The EBL, art. 13.
13. 1 I O , ) [Provisions of the Su-
preme People's Court on the Designation of Administrators during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy
Cases], (promulgated by Standing Comm., Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 12, 2007, effective June 1, 2007), art. I
(China) [hereinafter Designation of Administrators].
14. The EBL, art. 27.
15. Id. art. 24.
16. Id. art. 84, 2.
17. Id. art. 86, 2.
18. HAIZHENG ZHANG, Corporate Rescue, in CHINA'S NEw ENTERPRISE BANKRuPrcy LAw-CoNTEXT,
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 207, 207 (Rebecca Parry, Yongqian Xu, and Haizheng Zhang eds.,
2010).
19. Id.
20. The EBL, art. 81.
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extendable for another three months.21 In connection to that, the People's Court would
have to convene the creditors' meeting within thirty days from the date of receipt of the
draft reorganization plan to entitle the creditors to vote on the draft reorganization plan. 22
By this time, the procedure would have taken up a maximum of ten months already
(6+3+1=10 months). Because it also requires the court's approval, the reorganization plan,
once approved, requires a public announcement to be made within thirty days from the
date of the court's receipt of the application. 23 This means that it will take a minimum of
eleven months (6+3+1+1=11 months) for a reorganization plan to be carried out
successfully.
Needless to say, due to the 'dual approval' requirement, where the reorganization plan
fails to obtain approval either by the creditors or the court, the undergoing of an entire
procedure will most likely exceed one year. It may drag even longer because the EBL
does not set a time limit for the court to approve a reorganization plan that has survived
initially in the creditors' meeting. There also seems no prescribed time limit for the court
to exercise discretion to 'cram-down' an unsuccessful reorganization plan that the dissent-
ing creditors failed to approve.
That said, one should be mindful about the strict time limits set by the EBL for the
court to handle expeditiously corporate bankruptcy applications. For example, in a credi-
tor's bankruptcy petition, the court has five days from the date of receipt of the application
to notify the debtor, who is given seven days from the date of receipt of the notification
from the court to object to the creditor's application. The court shall also make an order
whether or not to accept the bankruptcy application within ten _days from the date of
expiration of the time limit for the debtor to file with the court objections against the
creditor's application. 24 Conversely, in a debtor's bankruptcy petition, the court normally
would have fifteen days in which to decide whether or not to accept a bankruptcy applica-
tion, although in special circumstances, it might be necessary for the court to extend the
time period, usually for a further fifteen days upon approval by the court at the next
higher level.25 Once an application has been accepted by the court, it has twenty-five days
from the date on which it makes an order to accept a bankruptcy application to notify
known creditors and to make a public announcement of its decision. 26 In addition to
Articles 10-14 of the EBL as aforementioned, the timeliness requirement can also be
found in other parts of the EBL, such as in Article 111 of the EBL that involves the timely
realization and distribution of the debtor company's assets.
The role, appointment, and remuneration of administrators have been set and provided
with some detail as a result of the SPC's issuance and adoption of (1) the "Provisions of
the Supreme People's Court on the Designation of Administrators During the Trial of
Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases" and (2) the "Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on
Determination of the Administrator's Remunerations" (collectively, the SPC Provi-
21. Id. art. 79.
22. Id. art. 84. The adoption of the reorganization plan requires the approval of a (simple) majority of
creditors in each voting group who are present at the meeting, and that the majority represents claims
amounting to at least 2/3rd (two-thirds) of the total amount of the outstanding claims.
23. Id. art. 86.
24. Id. art. 10.
25. Id.
26. Id. art. 14.
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sions)-both were issued on April 12, 2007 in supplement to the EBL. A report by The
World Bank suggested that in the past fifteen years, some countries have moved towards
devising a particular set of rules for regulating administrators, reflecting not only the need
for protecting both individual and public economic interests, but also an increased aware-
ness of the complexity involving corporate bankruptcy issues and hence its potentially far-
reaching impact. 27 Whether bankruptcy reorganization can be carried out successfully
depends a lot on the ability, qualification, and professionalism exhibited by the administra-
tors; hence it has been suggested that the study of administrator systems is conducive to
the successful development of a reorganization process within a corporate bankruptcy
system.
To this end, the commentator referred to the INSOL International 2005 Global Mar-
ketplace Survey,28 suggesting that bankruptcy services, implied to include bankruptcy re-
organization, are executed principally by professional (bankruptcy) administrators, of
whose professional qualification can be divided into two categories: licensed and unli-
censed. In England, Canada, and Australia, a strict licensing system is adopted for qualify-
ing administrators; whereas, in the United States, where a 'private trustee' system is
adopted, it does not require strict licensing but is nonetheless guided by a de facto licens-
ing system due to the stringent performance standards required of trustees in the United
States. 29 In China, the administrators must be appointed by the court, and such position
should be held by either 'individual administrators' (e.g., lawyers or accountants) or by
'institutional administrators' (i.e., 'social intermediary institutions,' which are law firms,
accounting firms, and/or liquidation firms). 3o It is suggested that pursuant to the SPC
Provisions, jurisdictions in China are authorized and thus have been busy creating 'Ad-
ministrators Lists;' and those that have been placed on the list will be the first to enter into
the market of bankruptcy practice following the recent bankruptcy reform.31
In preparing the 'Administrators List,' the High Court of Chongqing City developed
the "Chongqing Model" to limit the court's unchecked, wide discretionary power and to
restrain corruption because most of the information used in the five categories (details will
be expounded further below) is both verifiable and available for public scrutiny. As such,
it is easier for failed applicants to challenge the court's selection process if they feel they
were unfairly treated. The Chongqing Model is commendable and has been followed by
jurisdictions in Beijing and Tianjin, with only small variations.32 By juxtaposing the
Chongqing Model and the SPC Provisions, it is clear that the model was not far from the
existing regulations.33
27. Peter Joyce, World Bank Global Forum on Insolvency Risk Management Standards and Strategies, Jan.
28-29, 2003, The Regulatory Gap: The Cost of Capacity Building, available at http://www.insolvencyreg.org/sub.
publications/docs/Paper%20Gordon%20Johnson%20World%2Bank.doc.
28. The Survey was released by INSOL International in 2006. See WEI-GUANG Liu, RESEARCH ON THE
DESIGN OF CHINESE INSOLVENCY ADMINISTRATOR SYSTEAM-DocrORAL FORUM OF PROMISING Ac-
COUNTING STARS (The book is printed in Chinese with an English title) (Dalian: Dalian Publishing House)
(2009), at 4.
29. Id.
30. The EBL, art. 24.
31. Lawrence (Lixin) Yang, Administrator in China's New Bankruptcy Law: Oljective Standards to Limit Dis-
cretion and Expand Market Controls, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 533 (2008).
32. Id. at 540-41.
33. Designation of Administrators, arts. 6-7.
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The court's discretion needs to be guided properly or restrained, or it will likely be
subject to abuse or misconstruction. First, the EBL simply uses the 'negative conditions'
to disqualify those who wish to be qualified as administrators.34 Second, the SPC Provi-
sions were designed to keep the door wide open for lawyers/accountants and their associ-
ated social intermediaries to apply to be included in the 'Administrators List,' as long as
they have 'professional knowledge and adequate practicing qualifications.' 35 The selection
decisions thus will be left with a court with higher level jurisdiction than the People's
Court (or the intermediary People's Court within its jurisdiction), "according to the num-
ber of law firms, accounting firms, bankruptcy liquidation firms and other social interme-
diary agencies, number of full-time practitioners, and number of enterprise bankruptcy
cases within its jurisdiction," all defined loosely. Therefore, none of these terms should be
treated as objective criteria whereby the court can apply easily such vague terms to decide
who may be named to the 'Administrators List.'
To address this problem, the Chongqing Model adopts a one hundred point scoring
system for evaluating law firms, using five categories: 36 (1) achievement in practice (up to
thirty-five points);37 (2) firm size (up to twenty-five points);38 (3) experience in handling
bankruptcy cases (up to twenty points); 39 (4) competency (up to ten points);4 0 and (5) level
of specialty (up to ten points).41 The fourteen law firms with the top overall scores will be
named to the Preliminary Administrators List,42 which must be published on the Court's
website to solicit public comment or objection.43 The list is finalized within ten days if
there are no objections. 4
For evaluating accounting and liquidation firms, the criteria are similar to those for law
firms-the above-mentioned five categories are still applicable, but with a higher qualifi-
cation threshold for annual income, hired employees, number of cases handled, etc. The
accounting firms with the top five scores are named to the Preliminary Administrators
List for public comment and objection in the same fashion as law firms. In the evaluation
of liquidation firms, because they account for a small number of the total number of insti-
tutional administrators, their assessment criteria have not attracted much attention.45
34. For example, pursuant to Article 24 of the EBL, "individuals or organizations that have been convicted
of intentional crimes, whose license has been revoked, are an interested party in the case, or otherwise
deemed unfit by the court are disqualified from serving as an administrator." The EBL, art. 24.
35. Designation of Administrators, arts. 2-4.
36. Yang, supra note 31, at 535-40.
37. Id. at 536 (the first criterion concerns the firm's annual gross income or the award or praise it received
from the tax or other relevant government departments).
38. Id. (the second criterion looks at the firm's number of employees and its leased office space).
39. Id. (the third criterion refers to the number of full-time lawyers hired to handle for each bankruptcy
case).
40. Id. (the fourth criterion focuses on the speed at which a certain number of civil cases have been handled
annually).
41. Id. at 536-37 (the fifth criterion helps prove for the law firm's specialty, based on the number of journal
articles that have been published on civil cases).
42. Id. at 537.
43. This is according to Article 5 of The Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Designation of
Administrators during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases, which prescribes that "the people's court
shall, through the most influential media within its jurisdiction, make an announcement about the matters
relevant to the preparation of roster of administrators . . . . Designation of Administrators, art. 5.
44. Yang, supra note 31, at 537.
45. Id. at 538.
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In addition to law firms, accounting firms, and liquidation firms (that can be named to
the Administrators List as 'institutional administrators'), individuals who work for them
can be qualified as 'individual administrators,' and are kept on a separate Administrators
List. It needs to be emphasized that individual administrators will have to be selected
from among lawyers and accountants whose firms have been named to the Administrators
List.46 For such individuals, their time in practice, achievements, level of specialty, and
experience in handling bankruptcy cases will score pointS47 for them;48 the ten lawyers and
ten accountants with the most accumulated points may be named to the first Preliminary
Administrators List, which also needs to be published on the court's website for a period
of ten days so the public may provide its comments and objections. 49
Because corruption and guanxi (the latter refers to the favoritism extended to those
associated with the network of influence)50 have played a notorious role in China's historic
and modern politics for government intervention, the objective criteria suggested by the
Chongqing Model should limit the broad (and thus potentially flawed) discretionary
power accredited to the court in appointing administrators. Despite the improvement, the
EBL and SPC Provisions are silent about when, if there is a timeframe at all, the new
names can be added to the Administrators List.51 It is also unclear why an individual
administrator must be selected from the institutional administrators that are already on
the Administrators List.52 It is particularly intriguing given the EBL already requires
practitioners to have effective malpractice insurance to administer a case as an individual
administrator.s3
As a matter of practice, the administrators are established by the EBL to replace
the liquidation group in almost all types of bankruptcy enterprises (
in Chinese), especially special private and .non-publicly owned enterprises
( in Chinese). But the liquidation group is not out of the picture
entirely yet, as its main function is to supervise the reorganization of all SOEs or State-
owned Holding Companies (Wl AW4MR&#, in Chinese) and Collective Enterprises
(MM St in Chinese).54 The remuneration of an administrator is likely to be much
higher than what the members of the liquidation committee (or liquidation group) can be
remunerated. The high level of administrator's fees explains why, in actual practice, reor-
ganization is adopted mainly by large enterprises, and reconciliation by small-and-me-
dium sized enterprises (SMEs), as is so indicated by the Superior Provincial Court in An
Hui Province (2 )i iR A R, in Chinese).5 5 Theoretically, however, reorganiza-
46. Designation of Administrators, art. 3.
47. The numbers of points required may vary, as there are different grades (Grade 1-4) of lawyers. Addi-
tional points may be gained for those holding a position as a professional committee member of Chongqing
Registered Accountants Association.
48. Yang, supra note 31, at 535-40.
49. Id. at 539.
50. Id. at 541.
51. Id. at 536.
52. Id. at 539.
53. The EBL, art. 24, | 4.
54. MING HUA WANG, i<> [Review of the Application of the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law by the People's Court in An Hui Province] in PocHANFA LurTAN ( , in
Chinese) (2009), vol. 3, at 340.
55. Id. at 341-42.
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tion can be applied to all types of 'enterprise legal persons,'56 regardless of the size and
scale of the individual enterprise.
H. Bankruptcy Statistics
Bankruptcy statistics are essential, especially those concerning the numbers of bank-
ruptcy (including reorganization) applications made every quarter or year because they
help identify the means by which such debt claims are ultimately resolved, whether it be
through liquidation, reorganization, or settlement. Stakeholders, most importantly
lawmakers but also including debtors and creditors, will inevitably need to draw upon
bankruptcy statistics to make data-informed discussions before attempting any resolution
options. As far as legislative proposals or reforms are concerned, statistical data can attest
to or, conversely, cast doubts on the efficacy of China's statutory bankruptcy system. For
creditors, quantitative and evaluative data may help assuage their concerns, if questions
arise as to whether the number of administrators in a local jurisdiction is desirable57 or
whether the court-appointed administrators in China are qualified sufficiently in accor-
dance with internationally accepted guidelines (i.e., the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Insolvency Law).58 While the U.S. courts took pains to publish on a regular basis the
bankruptcy statistics,5 9 information of a similar nature is not easily accessible in China.
The PRC courts have unofficially attributed the scanty information to the need for pro-
tecting the interested parties' privacy. There is presumably no subterfuge implied in the
courts' (in)action unless it is taken to conceal the EBL's implementation problem under
the existing political and legal culture in China. Worse still, recent research has suggested
that some government officials have interfered actively with the SOEs' bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in an attempt to boost local gross domestic product (GDP) by allowing only a
small number of enterprises to declare bankruptcy.6 0 By analyzing twenty-five corporate
reorganization cases in China, the underlying research led to the conclusion that the cur-
rent bankruptcy reorganization system, embodied in Chapter 8 of the EBL, has not oper-
56. The EBL, arts. 2, 7. The term 'enterprise legal persons' refers to both state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and enterprises that are not state-owned. Enterprise legal persons include (1) limited liability companies; (2)
companies limited by shares; (3) private enterprises; and (4) foreign-invested enterprises, but exclude partner-
ships and individual-owned businesses. The reason is because partnerships and individual-owned businesses
have unlimited liabilities. See WEIGUo WANG, THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (Peking:
Law Press China) (2007), at 4 (Chinese book with English title).
57. See Designating the Administrator, art. 2, where it stipulates that "a higher people's court shall, accord-
ing to the number of law firms, accounting firms, bankrtiptcy liquidation firms and other social intermediary
agencies, number of full-time practitioners, and number 6f enterprise bankruptcy cases within its jurisdiction,
decide to prepare a roster of administrator by itself or by the intermediary people's court within its
jurisdiction."
58. In T 39 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, it is stated expressly that the administrator should be
qualified appropriately, with knowledge of insolvency, commercial, finance, and business laws, as well as with
adequate experience in commercial, financial, and accounting matters. U.N. CoMM. ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, Sales No. E.05.V.1 (2004), availa-
ble at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitral-texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html [hereinafter The UN-
CITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE].
59. See News Releases, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/index.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2011).
60. Li & Wang, supra note 1, at 308-10.
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ated fully to the legislative design of preserving the bankrupt company's going concern
value.61
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62. By the categorization of original U.S. Courts of annual reports, bankruptcy cases in the United States
fall into either one of the two sub-categories: liquidation or reorganization, from which either one of the two
means bankruptcy cases will be resolved. Hence the total number of bankruptcy cases in the United States
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To better balance the rights of debtors and creditors, the EBL was designed for the
administrator to take over the role and function discharged previously by the liquidation
group under the old 1986 Law. The liquidation group mainly consisted of government
agencies or governmental institutions, among which were the Administration for Industry
and Commerce, Public Security Agency, Land Administration Agency, and the manage-
ment team of the SOE facing bankruptcy.63 Because so many government departments
and agencies were members of the liquidation group, the government therefore orches-
trated the direction and decisions. Government intervention was not uncommon, espe-
cially for earmarked SOEs whose bankruptcy applications could not be filed with the court
without having first obtained the approval from their supervising government depart-
ment(s). This may explain why the number of bankruptcy cases in China is dwarfed im-
mensely by those in the United States for the same period from 1999-2006, as seen in
Charts 1 and 2 above.
Chart I shows that the number of bankruptcy cases in China has increased dramatically
since 1996 and reached their peaks in 2001 and 2002, nearly fourteen years after the old
law was issued in 1986. Since the peak years, the number has since then been reduced
significantly-by 2008, only two years after the old law was replaced by the EBL, the
number dropped to 3,139, much lower than a year ago at 3,810 when the EBL first came
into effect. It is observed that the number of bankruptcy cases recorded was higher in
2006 (at 4,300) than in 2007-2008. The reason is believed to be that a larger number of
bankrupt enterprises preferred to file for bankruptcy in 2006 while the old law was still
applicable because they were more familiar with that law than the EBL.
Professor Shuguang Li,64 of The China University of Political Science and Law in his
joint article examining the EBL three years after its implementation, suggested that there
are gaps between legislation expectancy and actual practice.65 Since the EBL came into
effect on June 1, 2007, immediate revision of the law is suggested to be rather doubtful.
Speaking at the annual meeting of China INSOL in 2009, Professor Li, as a member of
the drafting group for the EBL, attributed the problem to a couple of what he labeled as
"abnormities." 66 First, the number of bankruptcy cases heard by the People's Court has
dropped significantly since the enactment of the EBL.67 Second, over the past two years,
hundreds of thousands of enterprises stepped out of the market, not by way of proper
bankruptcy procedure but by having their licenses deregistered (zhuxiao, 4#A in Chinese)
over the period from 1999-2006 (as shown in Chart 2) have actually combined both numbers for liquidation
and reorganization. See also Liu, supra note 28, at 6.
63. Emily Lee & Karen Ho, China's New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law-A Great Leap Forward, but Just How
Far?, 19 INrr. INSoLv. REv. 145, 156 (2010).
64. Professor Shuguang Li is the Director of Bankruptcy Law and Restructuring Research Center, housed
at The China University of Political Science and Law located in Beijing. He was also a member of the
drafting group for the EBL.
65. Li & Wang, supra note 1, at 303.
66. China INSOL is the China chapter of INSOL International. INSOL International, headquartered in
London, United Kingdom, promotes itself as "a federation of national associations for accountants and law-
yers who specialize in turnaround and insolvency." See INTr'L Ass'N OF RESTRUCTURING, INSOLVENCY &
BANKR. Psop'Ls, http://www.insol.org/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2011). Currently, there are forty Member As-
sociations in worldwide locations with over 10,000 professionals participating as Members of INSOL Inter-
national. Id.
67. SHUGUANG Li & ZiOFA WANG, REVIEW OF THE PRC BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 2009," INSOL Interna-
tional Technical Series Issue No. 11, at 1-2 (2010).
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or cancelled (diaoxiao, 1851 in Chinese).68 In Li's article, he highlighted the lack of use of
the EBL after it was implemented:
There were 3,139 enterprise bankruptcy cases in 2008 while there were 780 thousand
[780,000] enterprises stepped out of the market in the same year. Among the 780
thousand [780,000] enterprises 380 thousand [380,000] exited the market through the
path of deregistration (zhuxiao) and 400 thousand [400,000] through the path of li-
cense cancellation (diaoxiao)69
The statistics above mean that in 2008 alone, the rate for bankruptcy applications (by
making use of the EBL) accounted for only 4.02% of all business closures, quite an insig-
nificant ratio compared to deregistration (48.71%) and license cancellation (51.28%). If
numbers can talk, the EBL may have been viewed by many corporate debtors as too cum-
bersome70 to be acted on; hence they resorted to administrative procedures for a quick fix.
This could potentially leave their creditors with little or even no assets for recourse.
Worse still, the weak position of the administrators, compared to the strong position en-
joyed by the liquidation group in disposing SOEs under the old law, leaves them with few
bankruptcy fees. 7' To top it off, unless the creditor, administrator, capital contributor of
the debtor company, or any other interested party is willing to make advanced payments,72
when and where the bankruptcy fees fall short, the bankruptcy procedure will be termi-
nated early, leaving the EBL with no way to be applied and creditors stuck in limbo.
Last but not least, bankruptcy reorganization is reportedly used more frequently by
non-listed companies than listed companies. A more recent book publication, of which
Professor Li was a co-author, indicated that over a period of three years (since June 1,
2007, when the EBL came into effect, and up until May 31, 2010), there were in total 142
enterprises that entered into reorganization processes, of which 116 were non-listed com-
panies and the remaining twenty-six were listed companies; of these twenty-six listed com-
panies, fifteen of them have been reorganized successfully."3 In terms of the registered
capital or residual company assets before reorganization, it ranges from CNY218 million
to CNV2.291 billion (equivalent to approximately US$33.7 million to US$354.1 million)
for listed companies and from US$40 million to US$431 million dollars for non-listed
companies. 74 This suggests that for reorganization to be successful, either the listed com-
panies or non-listed companies must have maintained a certain level of assets, which shall
attest to its viability as a company. Compared to the U.S. bankruptcy statistics, relatively
68. MEMBER OF CHINA INT'L INSOLVENCY Ass'N ANNUAL MEFTINo, http://www.chinainsol.org/show.
aspx?id=556&cid=37 (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
69. Li & WANG, supra note 67, at 2.
70. For example, due to the 'dual approval' requirement, as manifested in Article 86 of the EBL, the reor-
ganization plan submitted by the debtor company must be approved by creditors of all four voting classes and
by the court. This arguably may render the approval more difficult to obtain.
71. See MEMBER OF CHINA INT'L INSOLVENCY Ass'N ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 68.
72. Tt [Provisions of the Supreme
People's Court on Determination of the Administrator's Remunerations), (promulgated by Sup. People's Ct.,
Apr. 12, 2007, effective June 1, 2007) art. 12 (China).
73. SHUGUANG Li & ZHi BIN ZHEN, i [LAw REVIEW OF CORPORATE REORGANI-
ZATION & RESTRUCTURING] (Peking: Law Press China) (2011), vol. 1, at 73. (The book is printed in
Chinese.)
74. Id.
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large companies, indicated by having generated an annual revenue of over US$100 mil-
lion, maintain a reorganization rate of sixty-nine percent (by undergoing successfully U.S.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures), compared to smaller companies with only US$25
million in revenue, whose success rate in coming out of bankruptcy proceedings as a viable
company has decreased to only thirty percent.75
III. The EBL's Outstanding Issues
Listed below are some outstanding issues that merit a further assessment for considera-
tions of future amendments to the EBL. The list is meant for practical discussions only
and cannot be deemed as exhaustive.
A. DOMICILE
The reluctance of judges to accept bankruptcy or reorganization applications also poses
a threat to the evocation of the EBL-"some judges may not be willing to accept applica-
tions until they can find out whose local toes will get trodden on." 76 The problem lies in
Article 3 of the EBL, which stipulates that the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy case shall be
reserved exclusively for the People's Court of the place where the debtor company is
domiciled.77 Article 3 appears to be overly restrictive, considering that China is a vast
country. The creditors and the assets of the debtor may be located throughout the coun-
try and the creditors may not be aware where the debtor's principle place of business is,
thus the 'domicile' issue can but should not bar the court from accepting bankruptcy peti-
tions. A suggestion might be for the domicile requirement to be tempered so that it will
enhance the likelihood for best preservation of the debtor's going concern value. In light
of this, Article 3 perhaps should be included in the future amendment of the EBL. Inspi-
ration can possibly be drawn from the domicile regulation in the U.S. Chapter 11, which
upholds a multiple-list of possible domiciles from which the creditors and courts can
choose in order to determine the debtor company's domicile.
Article 3 excludes the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy case to the People's Court of the
place where the debtor is domiciled. Supplementary to that provision, the SPC inter-
preted that the debtor's domicile refers to its principle place of business.78 Article 3 ap-
parently supplies little or no choice about where to file a bankruptcy case.79 In contrast,
the law in the United States is very different as "it permits a considerable amount of
choice about where an enterprise may file its U.S. Chapter 11 case . . . the case could be
filed where the debtor has its principal place of business, where its assets have been located
75. Id.
76. New Enterprise Bankruptiy Law Faces Severe Test, CHINA L. & PRAc., Dec. 19, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 27711718.
77. The EBL applies only to 'enterprise legal persons' and not natural persons; therefore, where 'the
debtor' is used in the EBL or mentioned in this article, it refers to 'the debtor company.'
78. See A A A R E rg Nl [Provisions for Several Issues on
Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases (No. 23)], (promulgated by Standing Comm., Nat'1 People's Cong.,
July 30, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002), art. 1.
79. William J. Woodward, Jr., Control in Reorganization Law and Practice in China and the United States: An
Essay on the Study of Contrast, 22 TEMp. INTfL & COMP. L.J. 141, 148 (2008).
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for the 180 days prior to the filing, or where it is domiciled."so Concerning domicile, the
U.S. cases have upheld that domicile includes, among other options, the place where the
corporation is incorporated.81 Using various attributes to link jurisdiction, the U.S. law
enables the debtors and creditors to choose in which venue and over which asset that
bankruptcy proceeding can be filed. Such flexibility is desirable for a vast country like
China, especially in circumstances where the creditors and the debtor's assets may be lo-
cated throughout the country, so that bankruptcy proceedings may commence sufficiently
early and thereby preserving the debtor company's remaining value. One should also be
aware of the problem inherent in making the domicile as the only linkage to the jurisdic-
tion of a bankruptcy case, which can be a serious problem in China where 'local protec-
tionism' runs rampant (at least that is still the case in some areas) and thus makes
bankruptcy filings against the preferred enterprises difficult to be accepted by the local
courts under pressure of the local governments.
On the ground of domicile, some judges might refuse to get the bankruptcy proceed-
ings commenced early for a lack of jurisdiction power. The U.S. law may again provide
some inspiration for future amendment of the EBL. It may, however, be likely to create
another problem known as 'venue shopping.'
In the business bankruptcy area, venue shopping in the United States has become a
focus of heated debate. In the United States' largely voluntary business bankruptcy
system, it is clear from the empirical data that those who control the corporate debtor
are choosing where to file for strategic reasons. The debate concerns why they are
doing so and whether this is a good thing.82
For now though it is safe to say that venue shopping is possible in the United States in a
way that is not in China.83 A public hearing to instigate the debate of venue shopping is
advisable, before the legislators in China decide whether China should follow suit of the
United States to expand the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy case beyond the point of the
debtor's domicile.
B. NON-OBLIGING ATTrUDE BY COURT JUDGES AND ITS IMPACT ON SECURITIES
REGULATIONS
Relevant to the last point, as indicated by a judge working in the People's Court in An
Hui Province, some courts have decided to hold off accepting bankruptcy applications on
the grounds that relevant SPC interpretations are still pending. This led to a slip of bank-
ruptcy cases in An ifui Province from 175 to 169 cases, over the one-year period after the
EBL was promulgated. 84 The numbers were supposed to have gone up instead in the
midst of financial crisis in 2007-2008. Also to be inferred from the judge's report pub-
lished in 2009, some judges simply preferred to apply the old law (i.e., the 1986 Law) over
the new law (i.e., the EBL), for the sake of their own convenience, even though the new
law had already come into effect on June 1, 2007 and thus should be implemented. This
80. Id. at 149; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1408.
81. Woodward, supra note 79, at 149.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. MING HUA WANG, supra note 54, at 336.
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anomaly in practice may be linked to the paucity of bankruptcy reorganization cases as the
old law contains no reorganization provisions whatsoever; in contrast, the new law dedi-
cates an entire chapter (Chapter 8) to that effect. Judges' negation to apply the EBL
deprives the creditors or other stakeholders (such as employees of the debtor company) of
the benefits and protection of rights, as intended by the new, and thus the more recent or
current, law. It also implicates that there may not be enough competent judges capable of
handling complex bankruptcy cases that generally require adequate expertise in commer-
cial, financial, and accounting matters. A longer trial period and even delay in bankruptcy
proceedings may also arise due to a lack of professional training among concerned judges
who either are not familiar with the EBL where time is of great essence or do not possess
sufficient knowledge in commercial, financial, and accounting to handle bankruptcy cases.
In light of this, the courts should streamline their human resources in order to handle the
growing number of bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization cases as can be foreseen rea-
sonably. This is especially true given that the EBL has expanded its scope of application
to all 'enterprise legal persons,' compared to the 1986 Law that applied only to SOEs.
Moreover, the EBL has also removed previous restrictions for bankruptcy filing-SOEs
no longer need to obtain permission/approval from their supervisory government bodies
to file for bankruptcy.
Presumably the non-obliging attitudes by some judges who refuse to apply the EBL also
make foreign investors in China query "how the bankruptcy process will actually work for
them-many are likely to decide to avoid using the [EBL] altogether, as it may not meet
their needs."ss The aversion to the EBL allegedly led more companies to adopt the 'con-
sensual methods,' in lieu of the legislatively-prescribed reorganization procedure, in deal-
ing with their financial problems, so as to avoid a "formal and public process."8 6
Consensual methods are often seen by foreign investors as more desirable, even though
the legislators' aim was to provide unified legislation (i.e., the EBL) to facilitate the reor-
ganization of both Chinese and foreign enterprises based in China. Needless to say, the
EBL's supplementary legislations will not be put to use if the EBL is not invoked. "There
is more prospect of foreign companies taking the view [that] the value will come out in
consensual discussions, rather than through reorganization proceedings under the EBL or
relying on the EBL as an absentee stakeholder."7 Wherever the EBL fails to be invoked,
it would inevitably put relevant securities regulations under pressure for non-compliance,
which include:
(1) "Supplementary Provisions on Pricing Shares Issued in Significant Assets Reor-
ganization of Bankrupt Listed Companies for Restructuring, 88
( 1 , in Chinese), which pre-
scribes that during the bankruptcy restructuring of a listed company, if the company
intends to carry out major asset reorganization through the issue of shares for
purchasing new assets, the price for the shares to be issued shall, after consultation by
each relevant parties, be submitted to the general meeting of shareholders for a reso-
85. New Bankruptcy Law Faces Severe Test, supra note 76, at 1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. l [Supplementary Provision on Pricing
Shares Issued in Significant Assets Reorganization of Bankrupt Listed Companies for Restructuring],
(promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Nov. 11, 2008, effective Nov. 12, 2008) (China).
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lution. 89 The resolution shall be subject to adoption by two-thirds or more of the
voting rights of shareholders that are present at the meeting, and shall be subject to
adoption by two-thirds or more of the voting rights of public shareholders that are
present at the meeting.90
(2) "No. 2 Rules on Contents and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies
for Publicly Issuing of Securities-Content and Format of Annual Reports" 91
( ~- ifJKMn N9 - in
Chinese), which mandates that companies shall disclose such relevant issues as bank-
ruptcy and reorganization that occurred within the reporting period, including appli-
cation to courts for reorganization, reconciliation, bankruptcy, or liquidation, any
courts' rulings concerning said reorganization, reconciliation, bankruptcy, or liquida-
tion, and that being handed down during the reorganization of companies, and other
material issues. 92 Companies that have implemented reorganization shall state the
specific content and implementation of such reorganization plans.93
By the name of it, it may be needless to say that the above-mentioned regulations (that
are supplementary to the EBL) are applicable only to and thus have a particular focus on
listed companies.
The reason for the declining number of bankruptcy cases is not the result only of
judges' shirking their duties to apply the EBL. Another major reason is the cost-prohibi-
tiveness of the EBL. The large amount of expenses associated with undertaking a reor-
ganization process has forced SMEs to reconsider reorganization. Reorganization costs
include, among others, (1) general expenses; (2) evaluation costs; (3) administration costs;
(4) other professional fees; and (5) administrative costs. All of these costs will be ex-
pounded further below. Understandably, these costs all together will likely be too high
for the average SMEs to absorb, considering they had come into financial difficulty in the
first place.
C. REORGANIZATION COSTS
Reorganization costs can be immense, within one or several of the following categories.
1. General Expenses
The EBL requires that the administrator or debtor company submit a draft reorganiza-
tion plan within six months (which is extendable for another three months) of the date on
which the People's Court makes an order for the reorganization of the debtor company. 4
To facilitate that requirement, the administrator must call for the holding of the creditors'
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. *9~.1n fl*:i42l3- [No. 2 Rules on
Contents and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies for Publicly Issuing of Securities-Content
and Format of Annual Reports] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Dec. 17, 2007, effective
Dec. 17, 2007) (China).
92. Id.
93. Id. art 41.
94. The EBL, art. 79.
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meeting, which entails not only a thorough investigation and confirmation of debts but
also a variety of other expenses for the purposes of producing creditors' lists and printing
and mailing said lists to (or calling) the creditors to inform them of the said meeting.
Moreover, Article 81 of the EBL provides that the proposed reorganization plan shall
contain the following contents, among others:
(i) the business plan of the debtor company; (ii) the classification of the claims; (iii)
the adjustment mechanism of the claims; and (iv) the repayment schedule of the
claims; (v) the time limit for implementation of the reorganization plan and (vi) the
time limit for supervision (by the administrator) over implementation of the reorgan-
ization plan.
All of the content requirements are highly technical and, in the making of a reorganization
plan, will require a great deal of secretarial assistance in making and tabling the reorgani-
zation plan.
2. Professional Services Costs
Professional services in commercial/financial trading will also likely be sought, in order
to transform illiquid assets into liquid cash to be distributed fairly to creditors of different
classes. Remunerations for these professionals who are service providers will add more
charges to the overall expenses towards reorganization.
3. Evaluation (or Financial Advisory) Costs
Evaluation costs stem from analyses for both the debtor company's business and assets.
The purpose for evaluating the business is for creditors to determine the debtor com-
pany's viability to operate as a going concern, while the purpose for evaluating the asset is
to "estimate the discount rate implicit in creditors' reorganization plan decisions."9 s Value
for the discount rate is essentially an assumption in evaluating the 'best-interests test.'
The best-interests test is embodied in paragraph (3) of Article 87 of the EBL, borrowing
from § 1129(a)(7)(A) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which states that a U.S. Chapter 11
plan cannot be confirmed unless creditors receive as much under the plan as under liqui-
dation,96 or put another way, unless the reorganization plan is calculated to benefit the
general body of the creditors. 97 In China, the EBL requires that a reorganization plan be
approved not only by the creditors, but also the court-this is known as 'double approval.'
Influenced by the U.S. practice, whereof court-supervised reorganization procedures typi-
cally require judges to apply the best-interests test, the EBL shall require the bankruptcy
judges to undertake the same test. A successful reorganization plan entails a discount rate
acceptable to the creditors for agreeing to a 'haircut.' 98 Creditors can also agree to ex-
95. Fabrice Barth6l6my et al., What Discount Rate Should Bankruptcy Judges Use? Estimates from Canadian
Reorganization Data, 29 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 67, 67 (2009).
96. Id.
97. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, art. 59(2) (Can.).
98. 'Haircut' connotes the creditor's concession to a "certain percentage of the debt owed to them in full,
complete, and final satisfaction of their claims against the debtor." See THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE, supra note 58, at 28, 27. In doing so, the debtor becomes solvent and may continue to trade,
because its debts are reduced. Id.
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change debt for equity in the reorganized entity; thereby reorganization entails a change
in the debtor company's capital structure. Proper value analysis is material in assessing
the feasibility of the debt-credit swap.
4. Administration Costs
Administration costs are the fees payable to an independent administrator appointed by
the People's Court. The EBL adopts partially from the U.K. model for administrator
replacement, which was not seen in its predecessor law (the 1986 EBL) as the latter did
not establish an administrator system, but rather provided that the (bankruptcy) liquida-
tion group be responsible and report to the court.99 Administrators in China must be
designated by the People's Court, 00 and once appointed, the EBL allows the administra-
tors to engage in a wide range of activities and responsibilities.' 0 The administrator's job
consists mainly of checking, investigating, and confirming bankruptcy claims, 0 2 for which
remuneration must be paid. The administrator's remunerations are to be paid out of the
debtor company's assets. In this respect, an administrator would "nearly always be an add-
on expense, or at least until the ranks of management were trimmed," 0 3 said one com-
mentator who proposes "[slubstituting the DIPIQ4 for the [administrator] saves money for
the estate [of the debtor company]."s 5 This is, strictly speaking, not the practice in
China, considering the EBL is essentially a hybrid of both the U.K. and U.S. systems-
the role of an administrator in the U.K. system is introduced to the EBL, but instead of
assuming 'management replacement' as in the U.K. model, the EBL adopts DIP as in the
U.S. model. Last but not the least, the remuneration of administrators in China will be
borne from the debtor's unsecured assets, pursuant to the respective percentage charges as
99. The EBL, art. 24. The same provision was reiterated in (1) Article 201 of the Civil Procedure Law,
A [Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China), (promulgated by
Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991) art. 201 (China); (2) Article 249 of the Opinions of
the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the
People's Republic of China,
RAA lMR iM (9 A$ g ) ) 5ff-Kl@%A [Opinions of the
Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the
People's Republic of China], (promulgated by Sup. People's Ct., July 14, 1992, effective July 14, 1992) art.
249 (China); and (3) Article 51 of the 'Regulation on Several Issues Concerning Hearing Enterprise Bank-
ruptcy Cases' A ( 1 ± l)[ [Regulation on Several Is-
sues Concerning Hearing Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases], (promulgated July 30, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002)
art. 51 (China). See also JIANI IUA XIAO, Bankruptcy Administrator: Status, Power and Duties, in CFHNA's NEW
ENTERPRISF BANKRUPTCY LAW: CoNTrErxr, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 89, 99 (2010).
100. The EBL, art. 13.
101. Id. art. 25.
102. Bingkun Ye, Filing of Claims, in CHINA'S NEW ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTcy LAW: Cow-rExT, INTER-
PRETATION AND APPLICATION 163, 178-82 (2010).
103. Woodward, supra note 79, at 147.
104. The debtor-in-possession (DIP) principle is central to the U.S. system, where the incumbent manage-
ment of the debtor company remains in place to continue to operate its business and manage its assets during
the reorganization process.
105. Woodward, supra note 79, at 147.
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stipulated in the "Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Determination of the
Administrator's Remunerations." 06
5. Other Professional Services Fees
According to Article Two of the "Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on
Designating the Administrator during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases," the po-
sition of administrator should be held by professional services firms (e.g., law firms, ac-
counting firms, or bankruptcy liquidation firms) or individuals (including lawyers or
certified public accountants).1 0 7 Each of them understandably possesses a distinctive set of
skills and, as such, it is not uncommon that an administrator would need to engage other
professionals to carry out a complex reorganization plan. For example, a lawyer appointed
as an administrator would have knowledge in law, but not likely in accounting or finance;
thus he would likely have to engage financial services firms for value analysis of the debtor
company, especially if such efforts involve the bankruptcy restructuring of a listed com-
pany with a major asset reorganization plan. In that case, on top of the administration
costs payable to the lawyer, other professional fees will also be incurred for the financial
services firms in consideration of their provision of services, inclusive of setting the price
for those shares to be issued by the debtor company, which would then form a newly-
acquired fund for the debtor company to purchase assets.
Professional fees are likely to be charged to the debtor on either a percentage basis or a
time-cost basis; the former refers to the estimation of fees being based on a certain per-
centage (usually agreed upon beforehand, between parties) of the debtor's estate and the
latter, on the actual time spent multiplied by the professional's hourly rate in rendering
the services described above. Professional fees could be high, especially for those financial
services that are highly technical and strategically complex.
6. Administrative Costs
Under the EBL's framework, there is a high degree of court involvement (hence the
legal fees payable to the court) throughout the reorganization procedure. For example:
(i) the debtor company or its creditor shall apply to the People's Court for entering
into bankruptcy proceedings;1o8
(ii) the administrator shall report his work to the People's Court, during the reorgani-
zation procedure;109
(iii) the administrator or debtor company shall submit a draft reorganization plan to
the People's Court;tto
106. A1 [Provisions of the Supreme
People's Court on Determination of the Administrator's Remunerations], (promulgated by Sup. People's Ct.,
Apr. 12, 2007, effective June 1, 2007) art. 2 (China).
107. Designation of Administrators, art. 2.
108. The EBL, arts. 2, 7.
109. Id. art. 23.
110. Id. art. 79.
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(iv) the People's Court shall convene the creditor's meeting for the creditors (of four
voting classes) to vote on the reorganization plan;'
(v) the administrator or debtor company shall submit an application to the People's
Court for approval of the reorganization plan;112
(vi) the administrator or debtor company may apply to the People's Court to cram
down the objection of the dissenting group(s) of creditors and, in so doing, ap-
prove the reorganization plan."13
Reorganization cannot commence without petitioning to the People's Court in the loca-
tion where the debtor is domiciled.114 Once the bankruptcy petition is approved and
filed,'s the administrator must call for the holding of the creditors' meetings, participate
in any lawsuit, arbitration, or other legal proceedings on behalf of the debtor, and report
his work to the People's Court.'1 6 Within six months of the commencement of the reor-
ganization period, the administrator or the debtor company is to prepare a draft reorgani-
zation plan.'1 7 The EBL requires the reorganization plan to be approved by the creditors
as well as by the court."t8 To that end, where the reorganization plan is not passed at the
creditor's meeting, the administrator or the debtor company may negotiate with the dis-
senting groups and a second vote may be convened after negotiation."' 9 Where the draft
plan is still not adopted by the second vote after negotiation, the administrator or the
debtor company may apply to the court for approval of the reorganization plan over the
objection of the dissident group(s).120 For any stage of work required under the EBL, a
potentially substantial amount of fees will be borne due to this complicated reorganization
procedure.121
While the legal fees are most likely to be paid only to the People's Court, if the debtor
company is involved with a third party (which is also bankrupt and to which the debtor
company is a creditor), then in order to receive the collectable debts, the legal fees will
also include those that are payable to a foreign court.122 More specifically, in instances of
cross-border corporate bankruptcy, it is possible that the administrator (of the debtor
company in China) will have to file a petition in a foreign court for accessing the assets
located outside China that belong to the third party.123 The administrator has the duty to
collect any receivable debts to be included in the debtor company's estate, from which the
reorganization expenses will be paid out.
111. Id. arts. 82, 84.
112. Id. art. 86.
113. Id. art. 87.
114. Id. art. 3.
115. The filing can be made either by the debtor, the creditor, or the investor with capital contribution of
one-tenth or more of the debtor company's registered capital. See id. art. 70.
116. Id. art. 25.
117. Id. art. 79.
118. Id. art 86.
119. Id. art 87.
120. Id.
121. EuJin Chus, China's New Bankruptcy Law: A Legislative Innovation, 20 CHINA L. & PRAc. 17, 20 (Oct.
2006).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 23.
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IV. The EBL's Deficiencies & Remaining Issues
A. REORGANIZATION USED RARELY IN CHINA
1. Low Number of Reorganization Cases
The low number of reorganization cases has been described in an earlier section titled
"Bankruptcy Statistics" above. Despite the EBL's modest success, certain bankruptcy ex-
perts in China seem rather optimistic about its achievements so far. In a joint article
published by Professor Li and Zhofa Wang in 2009, as noted above, it was indicated that:
[Tihe newly introduced reorganization system seems to be working well. There ap-
pear to have some reorganization cases since the enactment of the new law [EBLI,
especially that of some large listed corporations. There have been 16 reorganization
cases adopted by the courts of listed corporations [until] June 2009. There are also
some reorganization cases of close corporations.124
It is necessary to note that the number of cases (sixteen) herein is slightly less than the
number of cases (twenty-three) reported at the meeting of China INSOL mentioned
above-where Professor Li spoke in his capacity as the Director of Bankruptcy Law and
Restructuring Research Centre of China University of Political Science and Law. The
discrepancy in the two figures was a result of Professor Li's article being written before
the said meeting that took place on November 29, 2009.125 As mentioned before, a more
recent book publication co-authored by Professor Li further indicated that there are
twenty-six listed companies that have begun the reorganization process.126
Despite these slight discrepancies, reorganization is not used widely in China compared
to other jurisdictions. The number of Chinese reorganization cases over a period of three
to four years (since the EBL's promulgation in August 2006) is significantly less than those
recorded in Australia and the United Kingdom, following the respective promulgation of
their reorganization laws, 127 namely the Insolvency Act of 1986 (in the U.K.) and the
Corporations Act of 2001 (in Australia).12 s Contrary to China's slow acceptance of its new
statutory corporate reorganization system, reorganization under the Australian shelter re-
gime (voluntary administration) was used widely from its genesis. In Australia in 2003,
"40.3 per cent of all companies entering formal corporate bankruptcy went into voluntary
administration." 29 Although the actual number of companies having been reorganized
was not available, the ratio stood at a relatively high level, considering it was then only two
years following Australia's Corporations Act of 2001.130 In the United Kingdom in 1987,
one year after the U.K.'s Insolvency Act of 1986, there were 131 companies undergoing
124. Li & WANG, supra note 67, at 3.
125. See MEMBER OF CHINA INT'L INSOLVENcY Ass'N ANNuAL MEETING, supra note 68.
126. Li & ZHEN, supra note 73, at 73.
127. Reorganization in the United States is conducted under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Correspondingly, the Insolvency Act 1986 is the central piece of U.K. legislation while the central piece of
Australian legislation is the Corporations Act 2001.
128. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Insolvency Act, 1986 (Eng.).
129. ANDREw KEAY, A Comparative Analysis ofAdmin. Regimes in Aur. and the UK, in INT'L INSOLVENCY
LAW: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES, ch. 5 (2008).
130. Id.
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administration procedures.131 Note that reorganization, as the shelter regime, has been
introduced in the United Kingdom as simply "administration" and in Australia as "volun-
tary administration." China adopted the U.K. system, with the administrator replacing
the management of the debtor company in (bankruptcy) reorganization. In terms of ac-
tual acceptance and adoption of the reorganization system, the ratio or number in Austra-
lia and the United Kingdom, respectively, far exceeded the numbers recorded in China.
In the United States, a recent study by Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard Univer-
sity suggested that reorganization is very well received in the United States, as evidenced
by nearly all troubled companies having chosen U.S. Chapter 11 restructuring over U.S.
Chapter 7 liquidation; among those, seventy percent resulted in confirmed plans of reor-
ganization.132 Professor Warren's research was premised on data collected from large
samples of U.S. Chapter 11 cases filed in 1994 and 2002, against which she identified that
"almost half the unsuccessful cases were jettisoned within six months and almost eighty
percent were gone within a year." 33
To this end, Professor Warren concluded that the reorganization system under U.S.
Chapter 11 serves as a critical screening function to eliminate hopeless cases relatively
quickly.134 As such, she challenged the conventional wisdom that U.S. Chapter 11 is char-
acterized by a relatively low success rate and endless delay. 3S Unfortunately, the same
conclusion does not apply in China just yet. It has been known that reorganization can
take much longer in China, well over one year or beyond.136 Although a sufficient period
of adjustment may be required before the new reorganization legislation becomes widely
accepted, Australia's "immediately engaging" experience proved that it does not always
have to be the case. It thus merits further assessment to determine whether China's low
number of reorganization cases is any indication of its administration process being less
efficient and too costly.137 While it is an important issue, it is beyond the scope of this
article.
On the other hand, in terms of the cost of corporate bankruptcy, a World Bank report
conducted in 2010138 indicated that undergoing a bankruptcy process in China is esti-
mated to cost about twenty-two percent of the estate value in each year of the period from
2006-2009, which is about sixty-two percent more than the OECD average.1 39 To mini-
mize the cost, commentary in favor of DIP argues that substituting the DIP for the ad-
131. Id. at 108 (Table 5.1 Administrative Procedures).
132. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MiciH. L.




136. See World Bank, Wash. D.C., Doing Bus. 2007: How to Reform: Comparing Regulation in 175 Econs., at
105; World Bank, Wash. D.C., Doing Bus. 2008: Comparing Regulation in 178 Econs., at 113; World Bank,
Wash D.C., Doing Bus. 2009: Comparing Regulation in 181 Econs, at 97 (finding that closing a bankrupted
business in China took an average of 2.4 years in 2007, longer than the 1.7 years in 2008 and 2009); for more
details, see Lee & Ho, supra note 63.
137. For more details, see id. at 155-59.
138. World Bank, Wash. D.C., Doing Bus. 2010: Comparing 183 Econs., at 104, available at http//www.doing
business.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=42 (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). For more details, see also Lee &
Ho, supra note 63.
139. OECD stands for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
VOL. 45, NO. 4
CHINA'S CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 961
ministrator saves money for the debtor company's estate.140 In connection to this,
Professor Li suggested that even though the DIP mode is embedded in China's EBL,
"[a]mong the 16 reorganized listed corporations [as mentioned above], there are only 3
DIP cases."'41
The deficiencies of the EBL impel one to probe into the many hurdles to this law. In
addition to the relatively small number of reorganization cases approved in China,142 a
meeting at China INSOL mentioned above also noted that reorganization is undertaken
increasingly by more "Special Treatment" (*ST) companies than regular companies want-
ing to restructure themselves. 43 Special treatment connotes a distinctive "warning sys-
tem" that was formulated by the securities exchanges in China to warn investors of listed
companies suffering severe losses and that are at risk of being delisted from the stock
exchange(s). If a listed company accumulates losses for some consecutive years, varied
slightly from each and every stock exchange in China, that company's shares will be sus-
pended from trading; and during the period of suspension, if the company's finance fails
to improve, then its business license- will be revoked and the company's shares will be
delisted from the stock exchange(s). For example,
[A]ccording to the rules of the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange[s], listed cor-
porations suffering losses for two continuous years shall be [branded with the prefix]
*ST ... [e.g., a fictitious company known as "ABC Company Limited" prior to the
branding thus becomes, after the branding, "*ST ABC Company Limited"] to warn
investors of the potential risk that the corporation may be de-listed if the losses con-
tinue. If the *ST corporation continues to lose money for two years, it will [then be
further branded with the prefix] "S*ST" in the third year. If the company is still
unable to recover by the end of the third year, its shares will be de-listed.'"
It is worthwhile to note that "[s]ince the [listing cost] in China's securities market is quite
high, the *ST corporations still possess considerable 'shell value.' *ST corporations be-
come attractive targets of acquisition for outside financial or strategic investors."s45 In
2009 alone, there were reportedly at least ten *ST companies that began the reorganiza-
tion process, including among others *ST Xia Xin (*STXTrV, in Chinese), *ST Dan Hua
(*STPHE, in Chinese), and S*ST Guang Ming (S*STA PA, in Chinese).14 6 Among them,
unofficial statistics suggested that following the EBL's coming into effect on June 1, 2007,
almost all *ST companies applying for bankruptcy reorganization have been successfully
restructured, after which their share prices have soared.'47 This makes restructuring of
*ST companies a highly profitable investment in China, considering that reorganization
will generally only take about seventeen months to complete.148 For *ST companies, nor-
mally on the twentieth trading day after the People's Court accepted their applications for
140. Details will be further explained in the section titled "Reorganization Cost."
141. Li & WANG, supra note 67, at 4.
142. See MEMBER OF CHINA INT'L INSOLVENCY Ass'N ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 68.
143. Id.
144. Li & WANG, supra note 67, at 4.
145. Id. at 4.
146. Da Jun Wang, ?k;1E]R11049%iRO4J [Bankruptcy Reorganization: How Many Black Horses Have Left],
21sT CENTURY BUSINEss HERALD, Jan. 25, 2010. [The news story was printed in Chinese].
147. Li & WANG, supra note 67, at 4-8.
148. Lee & Ho, supra note 63, at 146.
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entering into a bankruptcy reorganization procedure, the *ST company will be suspended
from trading for a period of six months; then, it will take a further ten months for formu-
lating a reorganization plan, which will then need to be approved by the *ST company's
creditors and the court before its ultimate implementation.149 Once reorganization be-
comes successful, the *ST companies' shares, as the historical track records of such events
show, quickly soar and become highly profitable for speculators trading in the stock
market. 50
Restructuring of *ST companies is arguably the most peculiar side of reorganization
business in China. In common cases, the *ST company has minimal or no value (other
than shell value), and even so, reorganization application can surprisingly be accepted by
the court.' 5 Had the same type of cases been applied in other countries, bankruptcy
liquidation would likely be the one and only option to resolve the debtor company's debts,
as it lacked a viable business prospect at the time of bankruptcy application, a prerequisite
to applying for reorganization in most jurisdictions.152 An extreme example for this is *ST
Guangxia (*ST litr, in Chinese), which was bankrupt with no assets, no operating capi-
tal, and even no fixed business premise, and yet with its remaining shell value, CITIC
Bank entered into a debt transfer agreement with one of the debtor company's creditors,
"Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang" (V70 11300, in Chinese), from which CITIC Bank reportedly
took on debt of more than CNYI00 million.153 It was reported that Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang
was preparing to file a bankruptcy reorganization application in court, on the basis that
the debtor company's debts exceeded its assets.' 5 4 Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang sought to maxi-
mize its gains from the debt buy-out by getting priority claims against other creditors. 55
Had the *ST Guangxia ended in bankruptcy liquidation (instead of bankruptcy reorgani-
zation as the case was proceeding toward), the creditors' financial loss (including that of
Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang) would have been enormous. 5 6 While reorganization is the pre-
ferred option for Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang, it remains to be seen whether it can be carried out
successfully due to the conflict of interests between the *ST company's (*ST Guangxia)
original shareholders and creditors.1 "s As such, the case has been reported widely as
highly skeptical and controversial. 5
2. Application of the EBL by the Provincial Court
As with a majority of PRC legislation, the EBL's effectiveness will depend on how it is
implemented and enforced at the provincial level.159 Despite the difficulty facing the Peo-
ple's Courts in adjusting to the EBL, they have demonstrated good intentions in making
the transition from the old system to the new one.' 60 As evidence of the courts making










159. Eu Jin Chua, supra note 121, at 1.
160. Id.
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the transition to the new system, one may witness the recent acts of the Superior Provin-
cial Court in An Hui Province ( in Chinese). That court maintains
and operates a roster of administrators comprised of fifty law firms, twenty-six accounting
firms, and two bankruptcy liquidation firms.161 The administrator is appointed by the
People's Court through a transparent process of random methods such as rotation, draw-
ing lots, or machine-controlled lottery (roster system).162 Alternatively, the court may
even hold a competitive bidding process in its selection of an administrator who is to
handle a complex case (such as the bankruptcy of a commercial bank, securities company,
insurance company, or any other financial institution).' 63 By way of legislative design, the
'administrator' under the EBL is to replace the 'liquidation group' under the old law, so as
to provide fairness and transparency to the creditors. In that connection, the court's role
has become less dominant, shifting from "administrating" the bankruptcy procedure (as in
the old law) to mainly "facilitating and supervising" it (as in the EBL). But to facilitate the
matter, the People's Court shall first convene the creditors' meeting'64 (so as to take a
vote on the draft reorganization plan) and then approve the reorganization plan, if a ma-
jority of creditors has passed it.165 From a legislative viewpoint, the administrator is de-
signed by the EBL to lead the reorganization plan, and with the benefit of the
administrator's professional expertise and training, this is a move in the right direction. 66
As more evidence of the courts making the transition to the new system, one may wit-
ness the recent acts of the Supreme People's Court in An Hui Province whereby the court
has convened three training sessions for 380 civil and commercial law judges and seventy-
eight (bankruptcy) administrators to apply ind implement the EBL. 6 7 Such efforts are
also evidenced in its presiding of various symposiums for the discussion of key issues aris-
ing from the EBL.168 This is yet another move in the right direction.
B. THE EBL's COMPATIBILITY IssuEs
While implementing the EBL, some judges expressed the challenges they felt in dealing
with 'jurisdiction' and 'responsibility of proof,' highlighting the issue of the EBL's com-
patibility with pre-existing laws that are still in effect. For example, Article 3 of the EBL
sets out that the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy reorganization case lies in the People's Court
of the place where the debtor company is domiciled. The very same provision can poten-
tially create a conflict with the civil procedural law wherein certain types of cases (bank-
ruptcy being one of them) may be reserved for jurisdiction by a specific level of court
(4iSIMM, in Chinese) or special court (WjJ O, in Chinese).169 'Reserved jurisdiction'
is arguably a familiar practice for many courts in China, at least before the EBL came into
161. MING HUA WANG, supra note 54, at 336.
162. See Designation of Administrators, art. 20.
163. Id. art 21.
164. The EBL, art. 84.
165. Id. art. 86.
166. DERYCK PALMER, REcENrr DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRuV-TcY LAW IN CHINA, 2010 WL 3650157, at
*1 (2010).
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being, to sort out and further delegate to the specific division of the courts the cases filed
with them based on their internal management rules.170
Another compatibility issue involves Article 7 of the EBL, which allows the creditors to
file for the bankruptcy of the debtor company as long as the latter is generally unable to
pay its debt as and when they fall due.'17 To prove the debtor's inability to pay, the court
relies on information provided by and accessible usually only to the debtor company and
not the creditor; thus, it creates a limitation on ascertaining the true state of the debtor
company's financial affairs.172 Problems may arise where the debtor company does not
cooperate or fails to provide true accounts of its financial situation. 7 3 This problem is
further exacerbated as the EBL does not specify whether the onus of responsibility to
prove insolvency rests on the debtor company, creditors, or elsewhere.174 This legal la-
cuna will need to be filled for better creditors' rights protection. 75 It is applicable equally
for instances where the creditors files for reorganization of or bankruptcy against the
debtor company.
C. DIP PROCEEDINGS
Under the EBL, a debtor, creditor, or substantial investor is eligible to apply to the,
court for reorganization of the debtor company. 7 6 Generally speaking, once the reorgan-
ization application is accepted by the court, an administrator will be appointed by the
court to take over and manage the debtor's business and assets. 77 Accordingly, once the
reorganization application is accepted by the court, the managing power of the existing
board will be suspended, 78 unless and until the debtor applies to the court for the admin-
istrator proceedings to be converted into DIP proceedings under the supervision of the
previously appointed administrator during the reorganization period.179 From this angle,
the EBL offers a hybrid of the U.S. and the U.K. systems, the former being the DIP and
the latter being management replacement. 80 What remains unclear by the EBL is that it
does not provide instructions as to "who is entitled to make such an application-whether
it is the general meeting of shareholders or the board of directors."'81 This legislative
lacuna could "impede the implementation and effectiveness of the Chinese-modified DIP"
concept, as suggested by one commentator who viewed that given the limited manage-
ment power of the board of directors accorded to them under Chinese company law, the
board of directors, without the authority of the shareholders' meeting, should not be al-
lowed to petition the court for applying to convert the administrator proceedings to DIP
170. Id.
171. The EBL, art. 3.
172. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 46, T[ 25.
173. Id. at 46; The EBL, art. 8.
174. See generally The EBL.
175. Steven Arsenault, The Westernization of Chinese Bankruptcy: An Examination of China's New Corporate
Bankruptcy Law Through the Lens of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to Insolvency Law, 27 PENN ST. INT'L L.
REV. 45, 85 (2008).
176. The EBL, art. 70.
177. Id. art. 13.
178. ZHANG, supra note 18, at 215.
179. See id.; The EBL, art. 73(1).
180. ZHANG, supra note 18, at 214-15.
181. Id. at 215.
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proceedings. 182 In relation to this, the EBL also failed to account for what considerations
the court ought to make before granting a DIP application, which again as suggested by
the commentator creates yet another legislative lacuna. 83 Some suggested that the court
should investigate the root problem for causing the corporate distress and, if poor man-
agement and decision making is responsible for the company's bankruptcy, the court
should accordingly dismiss the DIP application. 8 4 Likewise, the "judges need to assess
whether or not the existing directors" are competent "to manage the ailing company" and
to continue "trading during the reorganization process."s85 To this end, the judges would
be expected to "evaluate the directors' experience and ability to deal with the balance of
risk and return, to negotiate and produce a reasonable and practicable rescue proposal
during the reorganization."18 6 By doing so, it is suggested that the debtor company
should submit to the court "the management records and board minutes along with the
DIP application for the consideration of the court;" on the other hand, the court should
also consult the opinions of the creditors and the representatives of the labor union(s) who
are familiar with the management's competence, governance style, and decision-mak-
ing.18s While all attempts for eliminating the legislative lacuna are commendable, the
questions remain as to whether the judges would be given too much discretionary power
in making relevant decisions and whether all the necessary investigations to be carried out
by the judges who decide on such matters could be completed within the prescribed reor-
ganization period of six months.188 If that time period is exceeded the unpaid employees
and creditors would suffer from the prolonged reorganization procedure and, which, if
unsuccessful, could lead eventually to and end with the corporate bankruptcy procedure
for the failing/failed company. Given that the EBL is silent on the amount of time before
which judges are required to make DIP decisions, it raises another layer of concern for the
law's effectiveness and application.189 It should be noted that, once the DIP application is
accepted by the court, the administrator who has taken over the business affairs and assets
of the debtor company shall hand over those back to the debtor company's management,
and the administrator's functions and powers provided for in the EBL should be exercised
by the debtor company's management.190
D. REQUIREMENTS FOR REORGANIZATION APPLICATION-TWO-LIMB OR ONE-LIMB
TEST?
The persons eligible for applying for reorganization are set out in Article 70 of the
EBL, being the debtor company itself, a creditor, or investors whose capital contribution
comprises one-tenth (1/10th) or more of the debtor company's registered capital. Then,
the next task is to identify the requirements for commencing a reorganization process. 191
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 215-16
185. Id. at 216.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. The EBL, art. 79.
189. ZHANG, supra note 18, at 216.
190. The EBL, art. 73.
191. Id. art. 71.
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The EBL appears to provide the same requirements for the debtor company to resolve its
debt, either through bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization process.1 92
Article 2 of the EBL states that:
"Where an enterprise is unable to pay off a debt that is due and its assets are insuffi-
cient to pay off all of its debtors . . . it shall clear off its debts in accordance with the
provision of this Law."'9 3
Article 7 of the EBL further states that:
"A debtor who comes under the circumstances described in Article 2 of this Law may
submit an application to the people's court for reorganization . . . or bankruptcy
liquidation."l 94
Considering these two articles together, it can be reasonably construed that, for a
debtor company to apply for either liquidation or reorganization, it must satisfy both the
'liquidity test' and the 'balance sheet test' (i.e., the two-limb test).195 The 'liquidity test'
(also known as the 'cash flow test') assesses the debtor's ability to pay off a debt that is due,
while the 'balance sheet test' gauges the debtor's total assets and total liabilities.196 In
contrast, a creditor can apply for the debtor's liquidation or reorganization by meeting
only the liquidity test. 97
For a debtor to apply for reorganization, the stricter two-limb test shall apply, but it re-
mains unclear whether a lower threshold test can come into play. That is because Article
2 of the EBL also provides that:
"Where an enterprise with the status of legal entity comes under the circumstances
described in the preceding paragraph, or [emphasis added] is facing the possibility [em-
phasis added] to lose the ability to pay off a debt apparently [emphasis added], the
enterprise may be reorganized . . . "198
Whether the legislators had ever intended for it to mitigate the strictness of the two-
limb test is unknown. Moreover, the debtor's burden of proof for the application of reor-
ganization is also unclear. At the risk of mincing words, the very word 'possibility' points
to a lower standard, but the [paring] word 'apparently' points the other way. The issue for
consideration is whether the provision, "[the debtor is] facing the possibility to lose the
ability to pay off a debt apparently," constitutes as a separate test, apart from the "two-
limb" test.199 On the one hand, this particular provision may be construed as evidence
that the EBL encourages reorganization by toning down the stricter two-limb test-as
long as there is "possibility" that the debtor would lose the ability to pay off to debt, the
192. See id. arts. 2, 7.
193. Id. art. 2, 1 1.
194. Id. art. 7, 1 1.
195. KIRKLAND & ELLis LLP, CHINA's NEw ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAw 2 (2006). http://www.kirk
land.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2272/Documentl/ChinasNew-EnterpriseBankruptcyLaw.pdf
(last visited Jan. 24, 2012)
196. TiE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 45-46.
197. The EBL, arts. 2, 7.
198. Id. art. 2, 1 2.
199. See id. arts. 2, 7.
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debtor can apply reorganization to the People's Court. On the other hand, as one com-
mentator suggested, this provision is not a separate test but rather an element inherent in
the meaning of the general cessation of payment.200 The commentator goes on to say that
this provision is not meant to mitigate the strictness of the two-limb test. The commenta-
tor's view is justifiable so as to eliminate potential uncertainties in the application of law.
Otherwise, due to the absence of objective standards, in defining the degree of which the
"possibility" (of the debtor's inability to pay off a debt) would become so 'apparent' that it
would amount to the debtor's inability to pay, the debtor could effectively be disqualified
to apply for reorganization under the EBL than it would otherwise be allowed to do so.
To assist effectively debtors with financial difficulties at an early stage, the commence-
ment standard for reorganization must be one that is less onerous than that for liquida-
tion. By extension, the reorganization requirement must not require the debtor to wait
until it is actually unable to meet its debt before making an application.
The liquidity test is seen as a preferred measure, as suggested by both the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank. First, the
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, adopted by the UNCITRAL in 2004, suggests that the
liquidity test serves to discover early in the period of the debtor company's financial dis-
tress, hence minimizing dissipation of assets and avoiding the 'asset-grab' that would cause
the dismemberment of the debtor company to the collective disadvantage of all credi-
tors.201 Although the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide suggests that the balance sheet test
suffers from a number of disadvantages and thus should not be used as the single test, it
does not object to a standard that contains both the liquidity and balance sheet tests.202 It
states only that if a single test for assessing corporate bankruptcy is adopted, it should be
the liquidity test, as in this case of the cessation of payments test, which provides an effec-
tive trigger for access to corporate bankruptcy proceedings. 203 Second, the World Bank's
"Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems" in 2001
also suggests that "the preferred test for insolvency should be the debtor's inability to pay
debts as they come due-known as the liquidity test. A balance sheet test may be used as
an alternative secondary test, but should not replace the liquidity test." 204
E. DuAL APPROVAL FOR REORGANIZATION PLAN
Relevant provisions governing the reorganization system under the EBL are contained
in Chapter 8. The EBL dedicates an entire chapter for the initiation of reorganization
period and the approval of a reorganization plan. Essentially, reorganization in China is a
court-supervised three-stage procedure, namely (1) application to the court; (2) com-
200. ZHANG HAIYAN, An Analysis of Cause of Bankruptcy in the New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, in ZHENG FA
LUN CONG (i( fM , in Chinese), Issue No. 2, Apr. 10, 2007).
201. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 46, 1 23.
202. Id. The balance sheet test is seen as problematic because it relies on information provided by and
accessible usually only to the debtor, not the creditor; this creates a practical limitation on ascertaining the
true state of the debtor's financial affairs. In addition, the balance sheet test subjects insolvency determina-
tion to accounting principles and standards, whose adoption and interpretation vary across countries or even
different subparts of the same country.
203. Id. at 48, 1 29.
204. The World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systerns," principle 9,
at 8, (Apr. 2001).
WINTER 2011
968 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
mencement of reorganization period; and (3) 'double approval.' Double approval alludes
to the fact that the reorganization plan has to be approved not only by creditors of the
debtor but also by the court. 205 Where the double approval procedure is concerned, the
first approval must be obtained from creditors, who will be divided into separate voting
classes (such as secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and employment-related creditors)
for purposes of approving a reorganization plan. 206 It is important to note that approval
from each voting class is necessary for the reorganization plan to be adopted.207 The
second approval must be obtained from the court whereby the debtor or administrator
shall, within ten days from the date of first approval, submit an application to the People's
Court for approving the reorganization plan.208
To examine whether the dual approval requirement would pose any difficulty to the
implementation of the corporate reorganization system in China, it is helpful to see what
the international benchmark is. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide states that, through-
out the world, most corporate bankruptcy systems require only the creditors' approval of
the reorganization plan and not the court's approval; those foreign courts often approve
subsequently the plan that has already been approved by the creditors.209 Where the reor-
ganization system requires only 'single approval' by the creditors for adopting the plan,
even though there is no court supervision of the plan, the corporate bankruptcy laws usu-
ally provide for the plan to be challenged in the court. 210 Common grounds for the
court's challenge include reorganization approval implicated by:
(1) fraud;
(2) "irregularity in the voting procedure;"
(3) "irregularity in the organization or conduct of the meeting at which the vote was
taken;"
(4) inadequate opportunity for voting classes to participate in relevant proceedings;
(5) no access or lack of access to information necessary for voting classes to make an
informed decision to reject or accept the proposed reorganization plan; and
(6) unfair prejudice against the interest of dissenting classes of creditors.211
In contrast, where the corporate bankruptcy law requires the court to confirm a plan, the
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide suggests that the court's duty is to "ensure that the ap-
proval of the plan was properly obtained" and the stipulated conditions were satisfied.212
In relation to 'stipulated conditions,' the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide suggests that
such conditions shall include: (1) dissenting creditors of the plan would share the eco-
nomic benefits of the said plan; (2) dissenting creditors would receive "as much under the
plan as they would have received in liquidation;" (3) "no creditor would receive more than
the full value of its claim;" (4) normal ranking of claims under the corporate bankruptcy
law is observed by the plan; (5) "similarly ranked creditors are treated eqially;" (6) the
205. The EBL, arts. 84, 86.
206. Id. arts. 82, 84, 86.
207. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 226.
208. The EBL, art. 86, 2.
209. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 226.
210. Id. at 227.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 228, T 60.
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plan can be considered to be fair in respect of those classes of creditors "whose interests
are modified or affected by the plan but which nevertheless have voted to approve the
plan;" 213 and (7) the plan is feasible from a practical point of view. 21 4 Such stipulated
provisions, on the surface, are similar to the 'cram-down' 215 provisions in the EBL except
that the EBL does not provide any guidelines for the court's scrutiny.216 From one's
viewpoint, where the court's approval (i.e., second approval of the reorganization plan) is
required, the provisions should not be open to the court's wide discretion so as to prevent
undue judicial influence. Essentially, the court's approval should be constrained only to
legal formality. Likewise, the court cannot investigate into the merits of the reorganiza-
tion plan as it is not up to the court to make commercial decisions. The court should not
be expected to examine the economic and commercial basis of the decision of the creditors
either.
F. FoRMs OF REORGANIZATION
The EBL focuses mainly on procedural matters and is silent on the substantial matters
such as the forms of transactions that qualify for restructuring. 217 In this regard, lessons
may be drawn from the "Circular on Several Issues on Corporate Income Tax Treatment
of Corporate Restructuring Transactions," which is the tax implementation rules for cor-
porate restructuring. Under the rules, the forms of transactions that qualify for restruc-
turing are:





(6) spin-off (or splitting and transferring an enterprise's partial or entire assets (spun-
off [assets]) to other existing or new enterprises (spin-off enterprise) whereby share-
holders of the spun-off enterprise receive equity or non-equity payment of the spin-
off enterprise in return). 218
One needs to be aware of the distinction between the ordinary 'corporate restructuring'
and 'bankruptcy reorganization.' In the former case, the company most likely has not yet
entered into the bankruptcy process, but for various business reasons the company has
213. Id. 1 61.
214. Id. ' 62.
215. Generally, a reorganization plan will be approved only if (1) an affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3rd) of
the total amount of claims in each class and a majority of the same group present at the creditor's meeting and
(2) approval is obtained from all voting classes and the court. The EBL, art. 84. But, a court can "cram
down" a dissenting class and approve the reorganization plan once these four tests are met: (i) fair and
equitable test; (ii) best-interest test; (iii) no unfair discrimination and absolute priority; and (iv) feasibility test.
See id. art. 87.
216. Id.
217. The words "reorganization" and "restructuring" are used almost interchangeably in most bankruptcy
literature to refer to the rescue of a company approaching insolvency.
218. CIRCULAR OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND THE STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION ON SEV-
ERAL ISSUES ON CORPORATE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING TRANSAC-
TIONS, n. 59 (Cai Shui 2009).
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sought to augment its revenue; whereas, in the latter case (which the article is focused on),
because the bankruptcy proceeding has already commenced, the mainstay of the reorgani-
zation will rest on debt-repayment. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide conveys that
reorganization can take a number of different forms, including (i) a 'composition,' refer-
ring to a simple agreement concerning debts, where the creditor agrees to take a 'hair-
cut;' 219 or (ii) a complex reorganization, where debts are restructured; or (iii) a conversion
of debt to equity, together with a reduction or even cancellation of existing equity.220 The
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide sets the international benchmark for corporate bank-
ruptcy law, which is accepted by many countries including China, as the EBL conforms
largely to the recommendations of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and is therefore on
par with international standards of corporate bankruptcy law.221 Deduced from the differ-
ent context that provides for China's tax implementation rules for corporate restructuring,
such rules should not be understood to supplement the EBL without proper adjustment.
Where the implementation of the rules will impinge on the creditors' rights, especially
those expressly protected under the EBL, they shall cease to apply.
G. DISCLOSURE
For the draft reorganization to be acceptable, Article 84 of the EBL states that the
People's Court shall convene the creditors' meeting within thirty days from the date of
receipt of the draft reorganization plan so as to allow for the creditors to vote on the draft
reorganization plan.222 Then, the draft reorganization plan will have to be adopted by
each voting group (or class) of creditors before it can be submitted to the People's Court
for its approval.223 Because the creditors' approval is fundamental and prerequisite to the
court's final approval, one might suggest that, for future amendment of the EBL, provi-
sions should be made to give creditors reasonable access to information pertaining to the
debtor company's business operations, financial state of affairs, and assets. Information of
truth and reliability is absolutely crucial and indispensable for an ultimately successful
implementation of the reorganization plan; without these elements, the creditors would
not be able to vote with confidence and may instead decide later to bring individual law-
suits against the company through the corporate bankruptcy system, once the reorganiza-
tion plan fails to be adopted. In light of this lack of disclosure, the creditors would be
deprived of the chance to make an informed decision and may debilitate the voting mech-
anism provided in Article 84 of the EBL, rendering it a mere formality with little or no
substance.
H. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Reorganization has priority over bankruptcy liquidation, as emphasized by Professor Li:
"The new law [EBL] encourages insolvent businesses to choose restructuring methods as
first choice. Only when there is no business viability should the bankruptcy liquidation
219. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 28, 27. See also Lee & Ho, supra note 63.
220. The methods for debt restructuring are exemplified in THE UNCITRAL LEGIsIAHrVE GUIDE, supra
note 58, at 28, T 27. See also Lee & Ho, supra note 63.
221. Lee & Ho, supra note 63, at 149.
222. The EBL, art. 84.
223. Id. art. 86.
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process be adopted as the last resort."224 While Professor Li's efforts are commendable in
reviewing the EBL in 2009, he seemed to have left unanswered a lot of intriguing ques-
tions that could help in assessing the practical application of the EBL, such as:
(1) What was the scale and size of these sixteen listed corporations (as mentioned by
him);
(2) What was the jurisdiction of these sixteen reorganization cases;
(3) What was the reorganization cost;
(4) Whether those petitions were filed by the debtor companies themselves, their
creditors, or their investors whose capital contribution comprise one-tenth (1/
10th) or more of the debtor company's registered capital; and
(5) Whether the courts that accepted the bankruptcy petitions have exercised, at their
discretion, the cram-down discretionary power to approve the reorganization plan,
pursuant to the cram-down provisions embedded in Article 87 of the EBL.
One should consider these questions crucial as they would help in assessing whether reor-
ganization is expensive in China and thus accessible only to sizeable listed corporations.
Instinctively, there is a correlation between the reorganization cost and the size and scale
of the debtor company, given that reorganization cost will be paid off from the debtor
company's assets.
The jurisdiction of the reorganization cases might well be linked to the types of enter-
prises that are being rescued. In the midst of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009,
there were many reports of the successful reorganizations of private enterprises;225 it is
worth noting that there were very few reorganization cases reported for SOEs in China
during that same period. 226 This is somewhat perplexing as a review in 2007 suggested
that there were 2,100 financially distressed SOEs exempted from the EBL's application
until the end of 2008,227 not to mention that it is a well-known fact that many SOEs have
suffered economic loss for a long time and therefore were in need of being liquidated or
restructured. 228 Why would there be so little reporting on SOEs' reorganizations? There
are several possible reasons to consider. First, recent economic reforms in China have led
to a large number of SOEs being converted to corporatized enterprises, 229 stemming from
China's transition from a planned economic system to a market economic system. Sec-
ond, amid the financial crisis in 2008-2009, there were tremendous losses suffered by
many SOEs such as Air China, China Eastern Airlines, and China Southern Airlines, "re-
sulting from their entering into (often complicated) financial derivatives transactions;"230
but because they were experiencing only temporary business downturns, there required no
bankruptcy liquidations or bankruptcy reorganizations. Third, for those SOEs earmarked
for 'administrative bankruptcy,' whose insolvencies are to proceed according to the 'policy
bankruptcy' framework administered by the government and under State Council regula-
224. Li & WANc, supra note 67, at 3.
225. For more details, see Lee & Ho, supra note 63, at 167.
226. Id. at 156.
227. Steven T. Kargman, Solving the Insolvency Puzzle, 30 CHINA Bus. REv. 44, 45 (2007).
228. Lee & Ho, supra note 63, at 155.
229. The State-owned Assets Law is an Imperfect Guardian, CHINA L. & PRAc. (Nov. 2009).
230. Tighter Control of SO~r Engaging in Financial Derivative Transactions, CHINA L. & PRAc. (May 2009).
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tions, 231 the EBL (hence the bankruptcy reorganization) were rendered inapplicable. All
such reasons catered to the reduced opportunities for us to examine the reorganization of
SOEs. Suffice it to say that if SOEs have any chance of survival, the Chinese government
or State Assets Management System (SAMS)2 32 is likely to resuscitate them, by either
providing them with financial support or entering them into corporate restructuring
before the underlying SOEs go into bankruptcy.
Although this article aims to examine the practical application of the EBL from a
broader perspective, focusing especially on the reorganizations of all legal enterprises
under the EBL, the research result is inevitably restrained by the limited bankruptcy in-
formation available for public consumption in China. The article draws its conclusions
confined by visible research limits, but ideally the research should be examined on a larger
scale and on a more quantitative basis. One can only hope that the research horizon will
be significantly broadened so that the assessment may explore the issues in greater depth,
if and when more case law is accumulated over time and the bankruptcy statistical data-
kept by the People's Court (at the various levels) as well as by only a handful of bank-
ruptcy research centers in China-can be released for public information in general or for
creditor's protection in particular.
V. Conclusion
Bankruptcy reorganization is arguably the most cost-effective scheme in restoring a fi-
nancially distressed company back to a state of financial viability. Because the company
was in financial difficulty in the first place, for restructuring purposes it relies not only on
rearranging (or adjusting) debts but also, and perhaps more effectively, on acquiring new
quality assets in backing up a reorganization plan. Debt rearrangement (f[gWR, in
Chinese) can be flexible, and includes options such as (1) taking a "haircut" by the credi-
tors; (2) extending the period for repayment; (3) deferring payment of interest by the
debtor; (4) changing the identity of the lenders (meaning another lender steps into the
shoe of the original lender); and (5) swapping debt for equity.233 Once the reorganization
process begins, the restructuring will rely greatly on the sale of assets to obtain the neces-
sary cash to repay creditors. As such, a true and reliable assets valuation is essential in
controlling reorganization cost, which needs to be kept in check at all times. There are
other benefits arising from the bankruptcy reorganization. First, all debts of the debtor
company can be resolved fully once and for all, as the court will be supervising and presid-
ing over the reorganization case. The EBL requires the creditors who enjoy claims
against the debtor company to declare their claims within a period set forth by the court
for doing so, which shall not be less than thirty days at least and not more than three
months at most, calculated from the date on which the People's Court makes a public
231. The EBL, art. 133.
232. In China, a state assets management system (SAMS) was established in 2003 to manage the SOEs being
converted to corporatized enterprises. The SAMS, reflecting the state supervision system (on state assets),
has resulted in a new regulatory process set out in the PRC Law on State-owned Assets of Enterprises (the
SOAE law), which was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Oct.
28, 2008 and became effective on May 1, 2009. The State-owned Assets Law is an Imperfect Guardian, supra note
229.
233. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 28, [ 27.
VOL. 45, NO. 4
CHINA'S CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 973
announcement on the acceptance of the bankruptcy application. 234 It can be inferred that
most creditors would oblige to declare their claims within that period, as deliberate non-
compliance would likely render their claims unrecoverable. As provided, where a creditor
fails to declare its claims in accordance with the provisions of the EBL, it shall not exercise
its right in the implementation of the reorganization plan. 235 Second, shall the adminis-
trator work at his best in raising the recovery rate, it is often conducive to the creditors'
approval of the reorganization plan. And an acceptable plan (by the creditors) is also a
workable reorganization plan, likely to be implemented successfully. Third, debts that fail
to be recovered will be treated as being foregone by the creditors. This reorganization
and especially the restructuring of debt will benefit greatly the debtor company. More
often than not, as soon as reorganization is completed, the company's share price in the
stock market starts to soar, as a result of having restored investors' confidence in the
company. This provides one good reason why many financially distressed companies
chose bankruptcy reorganization over bankruptcy liquidation.
Despite the EBL's deliberate design to encourage and facilitate reorganization for com-
panies facing bankruptcy, the number of successful reorganization cases is quite slim. At-
tributive to this are a number of factors such as local protectionism, lack of qualified
bankruptcy professionals in China, and certain judges' inclination to apply the more famil-
iar old bankruptcy law over the EBL. Inadequate knowledge possessed by judges in rele-
vant areas can bring down sufficiently any reorganization attempts or efforts. This is a
radical problem in China where judges are sometimes Communist Party members and
appointed by the government; hence they often lack the qualifications, professional train-
ing, or legal knowledge as well as the required expertise in economic, financial, or ac-
counting matters. Considering that there is only one specialized bankruptcy court in
China, established by the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court ( in
Chinese) in December 1993, its undertaking of bankruptcy cases can be rather over-
whelming; reportedly, there are only eight to ten specialized bankruptcy judges in this
court in recent years.236 Shenzhen is a pioneer city in China, being one of the first five
economic zones in Southern China; until the end of 2000, its bankruptcy court had ac-
cepted 486 cases and closed 373 of them, or averaged sixty-nine accepted cases and fifty-
three closed cases per year.237 Professor Weiguo Wang of The China University of Politi-
cal Science and Law suggests that about 5,000 bankruptcy cases were filed in economic
trial courts, accounting for only 0.3% of the total of 1.5 million economic cases per
year.238 In addition to the few number of bankruptcy judges, there is also a lack of exper-
ienced bankruptcy professionals in China to implement the EBL in a consistent manner.
Various levels of People's Courts in China are aware of this problem and it is commenda-
ble that the educational responsibility is carried out not only by the courts but also profes-
234. The EBL, art. 45.
235. Id. art. 92.
236. Weigno Wang, Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform-An Assessment of the Recent Developments and
the Role of Judiciary, Strengthening Judicial Erpertise in Bankruptcy Proceedings in China 3 (Feb. 7-8, 2001),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/24/1874188.pdf. According to an anonymous judge in the
Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court, the number of insolvency judges working in this court remains the
same today.
237. Id. at 3-4.
238. Id. at 1.
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sional bodies (e.g., China INSOL) and discussion forums (e.g., Pochanfa Luntan,
fMP -tig, in Chinese).
SOEs are another inherent problem in China's reorganization system. In these cases,
government interference is likely to complicate the reorganization plan or process. For
example, the debtor company may be an SOE that may not have objectively healthy finan-
cial prospects or significant continuing operational purposes, and yet the debtor company,
essentially the state because it is both the main stakeholder and managing authority, might
subjectively decide to commence a reorganization application. This problem can be exac-
erbated under the EBL (in Article 87), where the SOE, as DIP, can continue to manage
the SOE as a going concern. 239 In light of this, the state will likely to have extensive
control of reorganization, notwithstanding the supervision by a court-appointed adminis-
trator. Not to mention that at this juncture, the appointment, qualification, compensa-
tion, and availability of the court-appointed administrator might appear dubious.240 On
the contrary, for those SOEs that are known to be subject to the pressure of the command
economy, they might otherwise find the judiciary predisposed against accepting their re-
organization application. From a third-party perspective, threatened by local protection-
ism, political interference, and rampant corruption, it remains uncertain whether the
courts would accept reorganization application from creditors or investors against those
enterprises (especially SOEs) that are important locally or politically well connected. 241
It has been suggested that the Supreme People's Court is drafting "a comprehensive
judicial interpretation on the [EBLI based on the problems accumulated and experience
gained during the recent four year implementation of the EBL. The existing draft of this
judicial interpretation contains about 300 articles, which is far more than the 136 articles
contained in the [EBL]. It is expected to be published within three years. A smaller-sized
judicial interpretation directing the insolvency of listed companies is expected to be issued
before this comprehensive one."242 In light of this, it is hopeful that all the outstanding
issues as discussed in this article can be clarified by upcoming Supreme People's Court's
judicial interpretations.
239. The EBL, art. 87.
240. Lijie Qi, The Corporate Reorganization Regime under China's New Bankruptcy Law, 17 Ier. INsoLvENcy
REv. 13, 28 (2008).
241. Eu Jin Chau, supra note 121, at 1.
242. Li & Wang, supra note 1, at 303.
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